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Introduction
Competitive political campaigns are still a very controversial issue. Discussions on this subject relate both to the influence of campaigns on political outcomes and to their impact on welfare.
In this paper we propose a model of political campaigns that allows us to study the interdependence between campaign expenditures, candidates' positions, and electoral outcomes. We focus on the following often-observed political races. At the beginning of a political race for office, two candidates try to obtain campaign support from interest groups. They announce positions in a policy space that are more risky the more they differ from positions announced in the past. One candidate has a firmly established position on the left of the political spectrum and the same holds for the other candidate, who has a firmly established position on the right side. Moreover, an incumbent may have a clearer position than a challenger because he has been in office for a long time, and thus has been able to build up reputation. Voters are risk-averse and the candidates will try to improve communication with them during campaigns in order to reduce location uncertainty which, in turn, allows them to move their political positions towards the current median position. Fund-raising is a necessary condition for getting messages across, so candidates will attempt to obtain campaign contributions at the beginning of the political race to gain mobility within the political spectrum.
Candidates maximize their vote shares.
We study the equilibria of this game and shed light on the role of political campaigns.
Our main results are as follows: We first show that there is a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates if interest group donations are prohibited. The game with interest group donations essentially brings forth two equilibria. Each candidate's chance of winning the election depends on the equilibrium that is realized. The winning candidate, uniquely determined in one equilibrium, is usually located closer to the median position and receives contributions from a majority of donors. An important feature of our equilibria is the presence of a certain run on donors' contributions. A donor 1 may contribute money to one candidate in one equilibrium and support the other candidate in the other equilibrium. As a consequence, even if candidates' initial positions and the ideal points of interest groups are symmetrically distributed around the median, the political positions chosen in equilibrium will be asymmetric.
Moreover, we demonstrate that donors may support a candidate whose position is not very close to their own ideal point in order to draw the position of the winning candidate towards their own ideal points. Suppose, for example, that the rightist candidate wins the election. Then, in our model, donors to the right of the winning rightist candidate give money to the leftist candidate, as this pushes the equilibrium position of the rightist candidate towards the right. Donors located around the median, however, will support the winning candidate. Constellations in which interest groups support the candidate on the other side of the political spectrum are observed in political races. For instance, in 1994 in Germany, industry organizations contributed a large amount of campaign money to the left-wing Social Democrats (see Gersbach and Liessem (2002) ).
Further, the candidates do not adopt the median position in the equilibria. However, campaigns lead to a partial convergence of positions towards the preferred position by the median voter, in comparison with the corresponding equilibrium without political advertising. Campaigns thus induce the winning position to move closer to the median ideal position.
Our analysis also enriches the incumbent/challenger discussion. A traditional argument suggests that incumbents are perceived with lower uncertainty than a challenger, which implies a disadvantage for challengers if voters are risk-averse (see e.g. Bernhardt and
Ingberman (1985) ). In our model, a risky challenger may defeat an incumbent if he is able to organize donors appropriately, because if donors believe that the challenger will win, a majority of donors will support him, thus confirming their expectations.
Finally, our results in comparison with other theoretical results could be used to draw inferences about whether candidates for public offices are more interested in policies or in winning elections. This will be developed in the concluding section.
While we perform our analysis in the framework with risk-averse voters where campaigns reduce uncertainty, it is important that the same results could be obtained in a variant of the framework suggested by Baron (1994) , where voters are either informed about intentions of parties and candidates or not, and advertising is persuasive. The closer the ideal point of an uninformed voter is to the historical position of the candidate, the more such a voter reacts to campaigns and a higher amount of money enables candidates to increase the share of voters for a given position.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we review the literature. In section 3 we outline the model. In section 4, we characterize the equilibrium when campaigns are absent. In section 5 we analyze the effects of campaigns. In section 6, we examine the candidate and donor equilibria and we illustrate the multiplicity by an example. Subsequently, we discuss extensions of the model and propose some final conclusions. Austen-Smith (1995) . Here lobbies make contributions in exchange for access to politicians. Politicians care about the information that lobbies can provide them with. The extent of truthful information transmission increases in the preference congruence between a lobby and the politician (see Crawford and Sobel (1982) 
Relation to the Literature

The Model
Electoral processes exhibit many features, but they can be essentially broken down into four stages, which include political advertising. The time pattern can be described as follows:
Stage 1: Candidates attempt to obtain campaign support from politically active groups. Donors spend their money to enhance the expected utilities arising for them from election. For tractability, the single-peaked utility function of voter i is given by We use V b and V c to denote the variances of w b and w c , respectively. The dependence on the effective position of the candidates is given by
x b and x c are the positions chosen by the candidates.x b andx c denote the most firmly established position of the candidates, that is, the location they are perceived to occupy with the lowest uncertainty. The variables f b and f c represent irreducible uncertainty, which we will call henceforth "floor uncertainty". k b and k c represent the mobility costs. Thus, if a candidate diverges from his established point, he will generate greater uncertainty, the higher values k b or k c are, respectively. We allow that the variables f b , f c and k b , k c differ across candidates. 5 Since voters are risk-averse, this makes spatial movements costly to vote-maximizing candidates.
We assume thatx b < x m = 0 <x c , which implies that we have a leftist and a rightist candidate as in most two-candidate elections. expected utility. The expected policies are x b and x c . From (1) we obtain
Voter i will prefer b to c if and only if E u i (x b ) > E u i (x c ) , which implies
We will outline in section 5.1 two different approaches regarding voter rationality that are consistent with this model set-up. From the candidate's perspective they recognize that w b and w c will be unbiased signals of the platform choices x b and x c , as
, and thus expect that a voter i will support candidate b if and only if
Candidate Equilibrium Without Campaigns
We here deduce the equilibrium without advertising which is called a candidate equilibrium. The candidates maximize their votes. We define the position of the voter who is indifferent to the two candidates' positions as (candidate c).
In order to derive a candidate equilibrium as a Nash eauilibrium of the candidates' platform choices, we assume interior solutions, i.e. the platform choices satisfyx b < x b andx c > x c . Precise conditions for interior solutions will be given at the end of this section. The first-order condition for the choice x c , given some position x b , requires that
By calculation of the corresponding first-order condition for candidate b, we obtain (see Appendix 1)
Proposition 1
In a candidate equilibrium with interior solutions, candidates choose the following platforms.
and
We note that the candidates choose different positions despite the single-peakness utility function of the voters. This result is caused by the fact that there is an incentive to deviate from a common position, e.g. the median position. It is true that a spatial movement toward more extreme positions will attract fewer voters by reason of the distance effect. But by approaching his established position a candidate reduces uncertainty and gains in reputation. This will overrule the distance effect if the candidates are very close.
If the candidates quickly forfeit clarity by leaving established positions (i.e. if k c and k b are high), the candidates will be very separately located in equilibrium. If f b = f c ,
(k b + k c ) and thus candidates are located symmetrically around the median. Moreover, we obtain:
Hence, for very small values of k b and k c and symmetric locations with identical floor uncertainty, we approach the classical median voter result.
Finally we spell out the conditions under which this equilibrium holds. We have assumed interior solutions, i.e.x b < x b and x c <x c . From equation (9) , the condition
Analogously, using equation (8) the condition x c <x c can be rewritten as
Next we turn to the investigation of campaigns. We assume throughout this paper that (11) and (12) hold. Essentially, this requires some minimal political polarization in comparison to mobility costs. That is,x c −x b must be sufficiently large relative to
5 The Effects of Campaigns
The impact of campaigns
As discussed in Section 3, our main assumption is that campaign expenditures affect voting behavior. In our model this occurs as campaigns can reduce the mobility costs One could argue that voters could derive the position of candidates with certainty if they calculated the equilibria of the entire game. This would require an enormous amount of knowledge as patterns of campaign contributions, distributions of ideal 6 We note that it is possible that x b > 0 or x c < 0 and thus both parties may be located on the same side of the political spectrum. As shown in Proposition 1 it is always guaranteed that x c > x b .
points of voters, etc. need to be known. We assume that voters are not able to calculate equilibria and vote accordingly. They vote sincerely and behave according to expected utility comparisons as expressed in equations (3) and (4). We could allow that a subset of voters are Bayesian learners and a subset of voters are strategic players knowing the entire game. This would reinforce our results as convergence to the median would be more forceful.
Second, we could interpret campaigns as persuasive advertising (see Baron (1994) or Grossman and Helpman (1996) ), where voters are either informed about intentions of candidates or only about historical positions. The closer uninformed voters are located to the historical position of the candidate, the more effective campaigns become and the easier voters can be persuaded to support a candidate. This would produce qualitatively the same result as the first approach, which we are using in this paper.
Campaigns and political outcomes
To define the contributions of donors, we first have to investigate how exogenous changes in mobility costs affect the candidate equilibrium. Accordingly, we focus on the political outcome arising from a reduction of mobility costs.
7
We begin by examining how a reduction of k c affects the candidate equilibrium. If candidate c can reduce the uncertainty surrounding his position, k c will be lowered in the third stage. Thus, we obtain a new candidate equilibrium with the same characteristics as in equations (8), (9) , and (10), but now featuring new parameters.
From the candidate equilibrium derived in the last section we deduce in the second appendix:
Using condition (12) we obtain 8 from equation (9) in Proposition 1
7 We note that the reduction of uncertainty can occur in two ways. First, the floor uncertainty represented by the constants f b and f c can be reduced. Second, the direct mobility costs can be diminished if a candidate leaves his established position. Both possibilities lead to greater mobility for the candidates and produce qualitatively the same result. 8 We also note that 
From equation (10) we obtain
Moreover, it will also be shown in the second appendix that
Thus, if candidate c can reduce mobility costs, we will have a new candidate equilibrium in which c will be closer to the median because his increased mobility allows him to gain more voters by approaching the median voter position. In general, candidate b will be forced to take a more extreme position.
Similarly, we will obtain symmetrical results if candidate b is able to inform the electorate more efficiently. Now we need to investigate the candidate equilibrium in the case of a reduction of k b . Again, the formal details are found in the second appendix:
Using condition (11) we obtain from equation (8) in Proposition 1
Additionally, we obtain
Hence, if candidate b can improve communication, his position will be drawn toward the center, and he will win more votes. Thus every candidate has a strong incentive to reduce the uncertainty of his position as perceived by the voters. 10 This incentive contrasts with insights in other political competition models in which there may be a preference for ambiguity when candidates are uncertain about the policy positions preferred by the median voter. This argument has been developed in an intriguing model by Glazer (1990) .
Donor and Candidate Equilibrium 6.1 The donor game
We now turn our attention to the incentives faced by political donor groups in the first stage of the electoral game. We assume that there is a finite number N(N > 2) of donor groups and that the ideal point of each group can be characterized by the preferred point of a typical group member equated with the donor. We use x j (j = 1, . . . , N) to denote the corresponding ideal points. We assume that interest groups are ordered according to their ideal points, i.e.
The level of support provided by a donor is determined by the contributions of the politically active members and is represented as E j . E j is the budget the interest group j has to support candidate j. We use E jb (E jc ) to denote the support that candidate b (c) receives from group j. We have E jb + E jc = E j . A donor will spend money on the candidate who is more likely to improve the donor's wealth than the other competitor. Thus we obtain two campaign functions that depend solely on the aggregate support levels received by each candidate:
The first derivatives k ′ c and k ′ b are negative because more campaign support enables the candidates to reduce more uncertainty.
We follow a standard assumption that contributors or interest groups are better informed than voters. For simplicity, we assume that donors are fully informed about the policies candidates will pursue in office. Hence, contributors observe x b and x c . Accordingly, the donor group will support b if and only if the contribution of candidate b leads to a political outcome that is closer to the preferred point than the one arising from support for candidate c.
The value of campaign contributions
We determine the value of campaign contributions for an individual donor. For this purpose, we consider four cases. First we assume that candidate b wins the election with or without the contribution of a donor j, given the contributions of the other donor. The value of campaigns for an individual donor j in this case is denoted by ∆U j (b) 11 and calculated as the difference between the utility arising from support b and c, given the decision of the other donors. Thus
If donor j supports candidate b or c, x . Hence we conclude that all donors with an ideal point greater than
will support candidate b in such cases.
Second, the situation is completely analogous if given the contributions of the other donors, candidate c wins the election with support (position x ′ c ) and without support of donor j (position x c ). The value of campaigns for donor j is then given by
From equation (15) we know that x ′ c will be smaller than x c . All donors with mostpreferred points less than
will select candidate c over b for campaign support.
The third and fourth cases concern scenarios where a single donor can affect the political outcome. These cases will be discussed later.
11 The variable b indicates that candidate b wins the election in every case.
Existence of equilibria
We finally establish the existence of candidate and donor equilibria, which we call in the remainder of the paper CD−equilibrium. Such an equilibrium is defined as follows. and voter decisions such that these strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium of the four-stage game.
We will focus on two types of CD−equilibria. In the first CD−equilibrium candidate b wins and in the CD−equilibrium candidate c wins.
Candidate b wins
We start with the circumstances in which candidate b wins the election. We define two critical candidate positions that will characterize the CD−equilibrium.
Equation (25) The left side of (23) is strictly increasing with x * b . The right side is monotonically decreasing with x * b , since we know that the lower k c is (or the higher k b ), the lower any equilibrium position of candidate b will be, which is represented by the right side of formula (23). Moreover, for x * b = −A, the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side as all contributors support candidate b. For x * b = 0 we assume that the right-hand side is smaller than the left-hand side.
12 Then, the value x * b that solves (23) exists and is uniquely determined. The arguments are similar for x * c . We obtain two different cases for the intersection of the left-hand side of equation (23) with the right-hand side, represented by the following figure:
Case 1:
Case 2:
In the second case, x * b does not coincide with any ideal point of a donor. Thus, by our definition of x * b and k * c , every donor supports one candidate only. In the first case, x * b is exactly the ideal point of a donor whose contributions are not yet included in the campaign functions k b and k c . As this donor is totally satisfied with the CD−equilibrium, we assume that he will refrain from providing any support or he will have to split his contributions among the candidates in order to ensure that the CD−equilibrium is not disrupted by his contribution.
x * b and x * c characterize a situation in which candidate b receives campaign contributions from all donors with an ideal point greater than x * b , whereas candidate c will only be supported by the rest of the donors.
We next establish
Proposition 2
Suppose that
> 0 and that x ind remains positive The assumptions of Proposition 2 can be expressed by the exogenous parameters of the model. We provide a specific example in subsection 6.4.
12 The formal condition is
Proof of Proposition 2:
For The intuition for the equilibrium behavior of donors runs as follows: Suppose donors expect the leftist candidate b to win the election. Then donors to the left of the winning leftist candidate will give money to the rightist candidate, as this pushes the equilibrium position of the leftist candidate towards the left. Donors located to the right of the winning position will support the winner, as this draws his position to the right.
Candidate c wins
In this section we construct a CD−equilibrium in which candidate c wins. We define The proof of Proposition 3 follows the same lines as Proposition 2.
Summary
The characteristics of the equilibria are summarized in the following figure, which represents the donors' ideal points, the median voterand the choices of candidates and donors in the CD−equilibria.
support c support b
An Example
We illustrate the multiplicity of equilibria by an example. 
with some parameter λ(λ > 0). For simplicity, all contributors are located at the median position, i.e. x j = x m , ∀j ∈ {1, ..., N}. The aggregate amount of campaign expenditures is denoted byĒ = N j=1 E j . We assumek − λĒ > 0. Then, we obtain
Proposition 4
There exist two CD−equilibria.
(i) In one CD−equilibrium all donors support candidate b. Candidate b wins and the platforms are
2k − λĒ (30)
(ii) In the other CD−equilibrium, all donors support candidate c. Candidate c wins and the platforms are
2k − λĒ (32)
The example illustrates how two CD−equilibria emerge. Either donors run to the support of candidate b ensuring that he wins or they jointly secure the win of candidate c. In both cases, the support decisions of donors are best responses.
Discussion of the assumptions and uniqueness
Before we consider further features of these equilibria, we shall first discuss the assumptions and the uniqueness issue. It is easy to demonstrate that, under the assumptions of the last section, the derived equilibria are unique. Let us consider, for instance, a potential CD−equilibrium, say x b and x c , in which candidate b wins the election.
If any donor with an ideal point less than x b supports candidate b, he can increase his utility by supporting c, which drives the political outcome toward his ideal point.
Similarly, a donor with x j > x b can do no better than to support candidate b in order to reduce the distance between the political outcome and his preferred point. Thus under the two assumptions the derived equilibria are unique.
Next we discuss what happens if one assumption does not hold. b , x * c ) cannot be a candidate equilibrium. Thus, in general, if a donor is pivotal in a potential equilibrium, it will not be a donor equilibrium. But again, if for instance, in (x * b , x * c ) the majority of voters in favor of candidate b is very small, which will enable one donor to change the political outcome, the CD−equilibria with (x * * b , x * * c ), will in general imply a substantial majority for candidate c. So, as a rule we expect in this case again one CD−equilibrium to hold if we have enough donors. 13 
Implications
The derived CD−equilibria have some remarkable consequences. We now discuss several important features of the case when all assumptions hold and both CD−equilibria exist.
Both candidates have a chance of winning the election that depends on the realization of the CD−equilibrium. Members of the donor group will support a candidate whose position is not closest to their own ideal point. In a CD−equilibrium with (x * b , x * c ) on the other hand, donors with x j < x * b will support candidate c, whereas a donor with x j = x * c will contribute to funding of candidate b's campaign. In any case, however, donors located around the median will support the winning candidate. If he coincides with the median voter, the median donor will always contribute to the candidate whose position is closest to his.
Campaign support increasing the mobility of both candidates leads to a convergence 13 Precise conditions can be given when distributions of voters and donors are specified.
of the candidates' positions in the CD−equilibrium since
and k c and k b decrease due to advertising.
14 This convergence does not end at the median or in equal locations, but the positions with campaigns are closer than those without campaigns.
Moreover, symmetrical political and support constellations yield asymmetrical outcomes. Suppose prospective campaign funds are symmetrically distributed around the median position andx c = −x b , f c = f b , and k c = k b without advertising. Then, in a CD−equilibrium, the candidates do not take up symmetrical positions. By contrast, in equilibrium one candidate c will win and attract the majority of donors despite the fact that both candidates are equally attractive at the outset.
A property of the equilibria is that small differences in candidate positions without campaigns do not destroy the incentives for donors to contribute, because a reduction of uncertainty affects the equilibrium positions. Political controversy is not a necessary condition for fundraising, which gives an important twist to the literature (e.g.
Congleton 1989).
The increase of mobility by campaigns does not necessarily imply that voters perceive lower uncertainty in equilibrium. Let us consider a constellation in which candidate b is located in his established pointx b without campaigns and wins the election. In the CD−equilibrium in which b wins, voters will perceive higher uncertainty, since b is drawn toward the center, which is associated with higher uncertainty compared to the outcome without campaigns. Thus campaigns that reduce uncertainty can heighten uncertainty in a CD−equilibrium.
It has been argued that consistent incumbents are perceived as a lottery with smaller variance than any challenger (e.g. Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) and Anderson and Glomm (1992) ). This fact can be easily incorporated into our framework. Suppose candidate c is the incumbent. We assume thatx c = −x b , f c < f b , and k c < k b without any campaign support. Then the incumbent will win the election without campaigns, since equations (6), (8) , and (9) imply that x ind i < 0 = x m . But our model shows that despite this initial advantage there may be a CD−equilibrium in which the challenger will win the election if he wins over the major part of the donors. This suggests another way of looking at incumbent/challenger competition characterized by the difficulty of defeating the incumbent. If and only if the challenger is able to organize donor support much better than the incumbent, will he be able to defeat the incumbent. Hence the electoral advantage for the incumbent can be suddenly outweighed by a new organization of donors by the challenger.
Concluding Remarks
We have examined a simple model of campaigns in which contributors support candidates who can then engage in costly campaigning. We have argued that campaigns may induce a run by a number of interest groups to support one candidate.
The results in this paper constitute a set of testable propositions pertaining to the relationships among a set of endogenous variables (candidates' policies, contribution decisions, amount of contributions, electoral outcomes, etc.) and a set of exogenous variables (incumbency advantage, distribution of voters and donors). Moreover, the model presented in this paper can be extended in several directions. The model could be complemented by other aspects of campaigns. For instance, interest groups may contribute money because they receive services or get access to politicians when a candidate takes office. This would tend to increase the incentives of interest groups to support the winning candidate and would reinforce the run phenomenon. Finally, we have assumed that candidates only care about winning the election. Suppose we assumed instead that candidates have policy preferences. As shown by Gersbach (1998), this produces a very different distribution of campaign expenditures across winners and losers. Comparing both models with empirical data could be used to test the objective functions of candidates, i.e. which objective functions of candidates are consistent with empirical campaign patterns.
Because of x c = 1 2 (k c + k b ) + x b we obtain
The last expression coincides exactly with Similarly, we obtain
